Prohibiting the Solicitation of Abortion—Viewpoint Discrimination and Other Free Speech Problems: Will Free Speech Guarantees Be a Casualty of the Moral Debate on Abortion? by Swift, William J.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 21
Issue 1 Fall 1991 Article 5
1991
Prohibiting the Solicitation of
Abortion—Viewpoint Discrimination and Other
Free Speech Problems: Will Free Speech
Guarantees Be a Casualty of the Moral Debate on
Abortion?
William J. Swift
Missouri State Public Defender’s Office, Columbia
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Swift, William J. (1991) "Prohibiting the Solicitation of Abortion—Viewpoint Discrimination and Other Free Speech Problems: Will
Free Speech Guarantees Be a Casualty of the Moral Debate on Abortion?," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 21: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol21/iss1/5
PROHIBITING THE SOLICITATION OF ABORTION-
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION AND OTHER FREE 
SPEECH PROBLEMS: WILL FREE SPEECH 
GUARANTEES BE A CASUALTY OF THE MORAL 
DEBATE ON ABORTION? 
William J. Swiftt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 19, 1990, the Governor of Guam signed into law 
Public Law 20-134.1 Under threat of criminal sanctions, the statute 
prohibited abortion in all circumstances except when necessary to 
save a woman's life or to prevent grave impairment to her health. 2 
t B.S.W., 1980, Creighton University, J.D. cum laude, 1986, St. Louis University. 
Law clerk to the Honorable Albert L. Rendlen, 1986-87, Supreme Court of 
Missouri. Presently employed with the Appellate Division of the Missouri State 
Public Defender. I wish to thank my wife Melinda for her assistance, support, 
and encouragement in the writing of this article. 
1. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp. 1422, 
1423-25 (D. Guam 1990) (Guam I). 
2. [d. at 1424. Public Law 20-134 was presented to the Governor for signature 
as Bill No. 848. The Bill, in its entirety, provided: 
AN ACT TO REPEAL AND REENACT § 31.20 OF TITLE 9, 
GUAM CODE ANNOTATED, TO REPEAL §§ 31.21 AND 31.22 
THEREOF, TO ADD 31.23 THERETO, TO REPEAL SUBSECTION 
14 OF SECTION 3107 OF TITLE 10, GUAM CODE ANNOTATED, 
RELATIVE TO ABORTIONS, AND TO CONDUCT A REFER-
ENDUM THEREON. BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE 
TERRITORY OF GUAM: 
Section 1. Legislative findings. The Legislature finds that for purposes 
of this Act life of every human being begins at conception, and that 
unborn children have protectible interests in life, health, and well-
being. The purpose of this Act is to protect the unborn children of 
Guam. As used in this declaration of findings the term "unborn 
children" includes any and all unborn offspring of human beings 
from the moment of conception until birth at every stage of biological 
development. 
Section 2. § 31.20 of Title 9, Guam Code Annotated, is repealed and 
reenacted to read: 
"§ 31.20. Abortion: defined. "Abortion" means the purposeful ter-
mination of a human pregnancy after implantation of a fertilized 
ovum by any person including the pregnant woman herself with an 
intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead 
unborn fetus. "Abortion" does not mean the medical intervention in 
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In addition to prohibiting elective abortions, the law declared it a 
(i) ectopic pregnancy, or (ii) in a pregnancy at any time after the 
commencement of pregnancy if two (2) physicians who practice in-
dependently of each other reasonably deterD;line using all available 
means that there is a substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy 
would endanger the life of the mother or would gravely impair the 
health of the mother, any such termination of pregnancy to be 
subsequently reviewed by a peer review committee designated by the 
Guam Medical Licensure Board, and in either case such an operation 
is performed by a physician licensed to practice medicine in Guam or 
by a physician practicing medicine in the employ of the government 
of the United States, in an adequately equipped medical clinic or in 
a hospital approved or operated by the government of the United 
States or of Guam." 
Section 3. § 31.21 of Title 9, Guam Code Annotated, is repealed and 
reenacted to read: 
"§ 31.21. Providing or administering drug or employing means to 
cause an abortion. Every person who provides, supplies, or administers 
to any woman, or procures any woman to take any medicine, drug, 
or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other means 
whatever, with intent thereby to cause an abortion of such woman as 
defined in § 31.20 of this Title is guilty of a third degree felony. In 
addition, if such person is a licensed physician, the Guam Medical 
Licensure Board shall take appropriate disciplinary action." 
Section 4. § 31.22 of Title 9, Guam Code Annotated, is repealed and 
reenacted to read: 
"§ 31.22. Soliciting and taking drug or submitting to an attempt to 
cause an abortion. Every woman who solicits of any person any 
medicine, drug, or substance whatever, and takes the same, or who 
submits to any operation, or to the use of any means whatever with 
intent thereby to cause an abortion as defined in § 31.20 of this Title 
is guilty of a misdemeanor." 
Section 5. A new § 31.23 is added to Title 9, Guam Code Annotated, 
to read: 
"§ 31.23. Soliciting to submit to operation, etc., to cause an abortion. 
Every person who solicits any woman to submit to any operation, or 
to the use of any means whatever, to cause an abortion as defined in 
§ 31.20 of this Title is guilty of a misdemeanor." 
Section 6. Subsection 14 of Section 3107, "Title 10, Guam Code 
Annotated, is repealed. 
Section 7. Abortion referendum. (a) There shall be submitted to an 
island-wide general election to be held on November 6, 1990, the 
following question for determination by the qualified voters of Guam, 
the question to appear on the ballot in English and Chamorro: "Shall 
that public law derived from Bill 848, Twentieth Guam Legislature 
(P.L. 20-134), which outlawed abortion except in the cases of preg-
nancies threatening the life of the mother be repealed?" 
In the event a majority of those voting vote "Yes", such public law 
shall be repealed in its entirety as of December I, 1990. 
(b) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Election 
Commission (the "Commission") sufficient funds to carry out the 
referendum described in this Section 7, including but not limited to 
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misdemeanor to solicit any woman to have an abortion. The law 
pronounced that: 
[e]very person who solicits any woman to submit to any 
operation, or to the use of any means whatever, to cause 
an abortion as defined in § 31.20 of this Title is guilty of 
a misdemeanor. 3 
During a 1990 speech before the Guam Press Club, Janet Ben-
shoof, the director of the American Civil Liberties Union's Repro-
ductive Freedom Project, acknowledged that Guam's law prohibited 
the solicitation of abortions, but -she nonetheless apprised the audi-
ence that elective abortions remained legal in the State of Hawaii.4 
Also, she provided a telephone number with which to obtain addi-
tional information about the availability of abortion in Hawaii.s Ms. 
Benshoof was subsequently charged with violating the law's solici-
tation provision.6 
In Roe v. Wade,7 the United States Supreme Court found that 
the qualified right to obtain an abortion was a fundamental right. 8 
Premised upon the right to privacy that is embraced within the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal 
liberty, this fundamental right could be limited only by a compelling 
state interest. 9 
In the more recent decision Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,1O and previously in the plurality opinion of 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,lI the Court has disavowed 
the fundamental right characterization, while describing the right as 
the cost of printing the ballot and tabulating the results. In preparing 
the ballot, the Commission shall include in the question the number 
of the relevant public law. 
Id. at 1423-25. The scheduled referendum was not held because of the district 
court's ruling. See Appellant's Brief at 4, Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.) (Guam II), cert. denied, 113 
S. Ct. 633 (1992). 
3. See Guam II, 962 F.2d at 1368 n.1. 
4. Guam I, 776 F. Supp. at 1426; see also Tamar Lewin, A.C.L. U. Lawyer Runs 
Afoul Of Guam's New Abortion Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1990, at A24. 
5. Id. 
6. Guam I, 776 F. Supp. at 1426. The charges were, however, subsequently 
dismissed without prejudice, apparently in response to the district court issuing 
a preliminary injunction in Guam I. See Plaintiffs' Brief at 71 n.73, Guam I, 
776 F. Supp. 1422 (D. Guam 1990). It was assumed by the plaintiffs that the 
charges could be reinstated if the district court's injunction was ever lifted. Id. 
7. 410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973). 
8. See id. at 153-55. 
9. Id. 
10. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
11. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
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merely a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 12 The 
plurality opinion in Webster was especially significant because it 
"invited" states to impose more restrictions on the exercise of 
abortion rights. 13 Cognizant of the shifting composition of the Court 
and its implications for the future guarding of privacy interests, 14 
particularly in the area of abortion rights, IS the Government of Guam 
12. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804-05 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, 
11.); ide at 2867 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and dissenting); see Webster, 
492 U.S. af 520 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.). 
13. Webster, 492 U.S. at 556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's dissent 
in Webster noted: 
It is impossible to read the plurality opinion and especially its final 
paragraph, without recognizing its implicit invitation to every State to 
enact more and more restrictive abortion laws, and to assert their 
interest in potential life as of the moment of conception. All these 
laws will satisfy the plurality's nonscrutiny, until sometime, a new 
regime of old dissenters and new appointees will declare what the 
plurality intends: that Roe is no longer good law. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
14. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277-
80, 287-89 (1990) (opinions of Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court and O'Connor, 
J., concurring) (holding that right to withdraw treatment from an incompetent 
person was a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, requiring a 
balancing of the liberty interests against relevant state interests); Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) (holding that there was no fundamental 
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause to engage in consensual homo-
sexual activity). But see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 304-05, 339-46 (opinions of 
Brennan and Stevens, 11., dissenting) (finding right to withdraw treatment of 
incompetent was a fundamental liberty interest that could be suspended only 
by a compelling state interest); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 202, 206, 208, 216 (opinions 
of Blackmun and Stevens, 11., dissenting) (finding right to privacy grounded 
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed an 
individual's right to control the nature of his intimate associations). 
15. In Casey, Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy authored a joint opinion 
which stated that the Court was adhering to the essential holding of Roe. 
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804, 2816-17. While so commenting, the joint opinion 
indicated that restrictions on abortion were to be evaluated according to an 
"undue burden" inquiry. Id. at 2819-20. An undue burden was defined as one 
which imposed "a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion of a nonviable fetus." Id. at 2820. Until Webster, abortion restrictions 
were subject to the more rigorous strict scrutiny review which required the 
advancement of a compelling state interest. Id. at 2844-47 n.l (Blackmun, J., 
concurring and dissenting); ide at 2855,2860,2867 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring 
and dissenting). 
Although the joint opinion in Casey reaffirmed Roe's central holding, see 
ide at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting), four other members of 
the Court would have voted to overrule Roe. Id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring and dissenting). The willingness of four members of the Court to 
overturn Roe prompted Justice Blackmun to observe: "I fear for the darkness 
as four Justices anxiously await the single vote necessary to extinguish the 
light." Id. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). To that obser-
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accepted Webster's "invitation" by enacting a law intended to pro-
vide the Court with the opportunity to explicitly overrule Roe. 16 
Guam's entire abortion-prohibition statute was found unconsti-
tutional by the District Court of Guam, which noted in particular 
that the solicitation provision violated the First Amendment. 17 While 
the Government of Guam did not appeal the invalidation of the 
solicitation provision, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision as to those por-
tions of the law that the government of Guam did appeal. lS 
This Article will confine its focus to the First Amendment free 
speech concerns presented by laws prohibiting the solicitation of 
abortion. 19 Prohibiting the solicitation of abortion strikes at the core 
values of the First Amendment because it discriminates on the basis 
of viewpoint. Such viewpoint-based discrimination prohibits anyone 
from furnishing women with information that is supportive or fa-
vorable to the exercise of the abortion option, but does not prohibit 
anyone from providing women with information that encourages or 
promotes carrying their pregnancies to term. The fact that efforts to 
prohibit the solicitation of abortion have not been confined to Guam 
evidences a climate in which the free speech guarantees of the First 
vation, Justice Blackmun concluded his opinion by adding: 
In one sense, the Court's approach is worlds apart from that of THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA. And yet, in another sense, 
the distance between the two approaches is short-the distance is but 
a single vote. 
I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when 
I do step down, the confirmation process for my successor well may 
focus on the issue before us today. That, I regret, may be exactly 
where the choice between the two worlds will be made. 
Id. at 2854-55. 
16. See Don J. DeBenedictis, Two Abortion Laws Struck Down, 76 A.B.A. J. 20, 
20-21 (Nov. 1990). 
17. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp. 1422, 
1428, 1429 n.9 (D. Guam 1990) (Guam I). 
18. See Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1369 
n.2 (9th Cir.) (Guam II), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992). 
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom 
of speech .... "). The First Amendment is applicable to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
In 1968 Congress amended the Organic Act of Guam, 48 U.S.C. §§ 1421-
1428, adding 48 U.S.C. § 1421 b(u), which extended particular provisions and 
amendments of the United States Constitution, including the First Amendment, 
to Guam. Guam I, 776 F. Supp. at 1426-28. Before invalidating the Guam 
law, both the district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that Congress did not intend 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1421 b(u) to mandate that the rights recognized in Roe also be extended to 
the people of Guam. Id.; see also Guam II, 962 F.2d at 1370. 
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Amendment have been targeted by abortion foes in their efforts to 
outlaw abortion. 
Prohibiting speech of the sort employed by Ms. Benshoof would, 
however, run afoul of the First Amendment even if the Court were 
to abandon Roe. 20 This is so because the prohibited speech does not 
constitute incitement that would likely culminate in immediate lawless 
conduct. 
Additionally, speech similar to that uttered by Ms. Benshoof 
cannot be forbidden under the First Amendment because the govern-
ment may not punish a speaker for discussing prohibited sorts of 
behavior. Finally, Ms. Benshoof's speech could not be prohibited 
because the government cannot ban dissemination of information 
within one jurisdiction relating to an activity that is prohibited by 
that jurisdiction, but that is legal in another. The multiple problems 
posed by prohibiting the solicitation of abortion must be considered 
in light of the values underlying the First Amendment and the Court's 
precedent addressing viewpoint discrimination. 
II. THE VALVES VNDERL YING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
AND THE PROHIBITION AGAINST VIEWPOINT 
DISCRIMINATION 
Three purposes commonly associated with the First Amendment 
are: (1) to permit informed choices by citizens in a self-governing 
democracy; (2) to further the search for truth; and (3) to allow each 
individual to develop and exercise his or her capacities, thereby 
promoting a sense of self-worth.21 The preeminent exponent of the 
"self-government purpose" was Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, 
who observed that "[t]he freedom that the First Amendment protects 
is not ... an absence of regulation. It is the presence of self-
20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia, in Planned Parenthood 
oj Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, urged the Court to get out of the 
"abortion-umpiring business." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2882, 2885 (Scalia, J., 
concurring and dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued that even if the Court 
were to abdicate its constitutional responsibility as suggested by Justice Scalia, 
it would still be necessary for the Court to review abortion related issues, such 
as the extent to which government could, consistent with the First Amendment, 
limit speech dealing with abortion. [d. at 2854 n.12 (Blackmun, J., concurring 
and dissenting) (posing question of whether states that choose not to criminalize 
abortion could ban all advertising providing information about where and how 
to obtain abortions). 
21. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 
43 U. Cm. L. REV. 20, 23-26 (1975). Thoughtful writing on the values 
underlying the First Amendment abounds. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content 
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 193 n.8 
(1983) (citing numerous authorities). 
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government. "22 In Professor Meiklejohn's view, the First Amendment 
does not protect a "freedom to speak," but rather protects those 
activities of thought and communication by which we govern. 23 This 
view is premised on the fact that the people created a form of 
government whereby they granted only some powers to the state and 
federal governments, while reserving very significant powers of gov-
ernment to themselves.24 Freedom of speech is essential to the vitality 
of our constitutional democracy because the people have chosen to 
govern themselves rather than to be governed. 2s In order for self-
government to exist, however, "the voters must acquire the intelli-
gence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general 
welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express."26 For 
Professor Meiklejohn, freedom of expression is an absolute in the 
realm of public affairsY 
The "search for the truth" purpose was highlighted by Justice 
Holmes in his frequently quoted dissent in Abrams v. United States. 28 
Justice Holmes stated that "the ultimate good desired is better 
reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market .... "29 For society to advance in knowledge, it is believed 
22. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SUP. 
CT. REv. 245, 252. 
23. Id. at 255. 
24. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation 
of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1, 11 (1965). 
25. See Meiklejohn, supra note 22, at 263; see also Brennan, supra note 24, at 11 
(discussing Meiklejohn's First Amendment theory). James Madison shared 
Professor Meiklejohn's view of the First Amendment, observing "'that the 
censorial power is in the people over the Government and not in the Government 
over the people.'" Id. at 15 (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 934 (1794». 
26. See Meiklejohn, supra note 22, at 255. 
27. See Brennan, supra note 24, at 12. 
28. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (involving prosecution under the Espionage Act of 1918 
for statements critical of the Government made during World War I). 
29. Id. at 630. John Stuart Mill similarly observed: 
Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the 
very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes 
of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties 
have any rational assurance of being right. 
See Karst, supra note 21, at 25 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty (1859), 
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 207-08 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1961». 
Professor Meiklejohn has disavowed any affinity for the "search for the truth" 
purpose of the First Amendment, his pessimism concerning the notion that 
truth will ultimately prevail is evident from the statement: "I have never been 
able to share the Miltonian faith that in a fair fight between truth and error, 
truth is sure to win." See Meiklejohn, supra note 22, at 262-63; see also 
Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion 
Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 284 n.314 (1989) (citing authorities critical of 
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that there must be unfettered competition between those views that 
predominate and those that depart from the mainstream.30 The search 
for truth demands protection of all views, especially unpopular ones.3' 
While Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams espoused the "search 
for the truth" purpose, Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v. 
Californian focused on the goal of promoting individual self-worth. 
Justice Brandeis noted that "[t]hose who won our independence 
believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to 
develop their faculties .... "33 Without freedom of speech, individuals 
are unable to realize their capacities.34 
A law that substantially impairs the communication of a partic-
ular viewpoint violates the First Amendment because by removing a 
particular message from public debate it mutilates "the thinking 
process of the community," and therefore is incompatible with the 
values sought to be fostered by the First Amendment.3s Viewpoint 
restrictions do not harmonize with the notion that there should be 
"equality of status in the field of ideas," so that all ideas dealing 
with a particular subject of public concern are accorded the same 
privileges.36 Because viewpoint discrimination implicates core First 
Amendment values, the government, when contemplating establishing 
the assumption that the existence of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas 
necessarily results in truth prevailing). Professor Ingber also has argued that 
the existence of a free marketplace of ideas does not insure that the truth will 
predominate, but instead the marketplace "serves as a forum where cultural 
groups with differing needs, interests, ana experiences battle to defend or 
establish their disparate senses of what is 'true' or 'best.'" Stanley Ingber, The 
Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 27. 
30. See Karst, supra note 21, at 25. 
31. Id. 
32. 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (involving prosecution under the California Criminal 
Syndicalism Act for activities in the Communist party). 
33. Id. at 375 (emphasis added). 
34. See Karst, supra note 21, at 26. 
35. See Stone, supra note 21, at 198 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL 
FREEDOM 27 (1960». 
36. See Paul B. Stephan, III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 
68 VA. L. REv. 203, 233 n.136 (1982) (quoting and discussing ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960». John Stuart Mill made an insight-
ful comment condemning efforts directed at suppressing disfavored viewpoints: 
"If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of 
the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that 
one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing 
mankind." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY 18 (David Spitz ed. 1975); cf. 
City Of Madison Joint School Dist. No.8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976) (stating that to permit one side of a 
debata.ble public question to have a monopoly in express1ng its views is the 
antithesis of constitutional guarantees). 
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viewpoint-based regulation, must be sure to fashion a precisely drawn 
means of advancing a compelling governmental interest. 37 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of viewpoint discrimi-
nation in Cornelius v. NAA CP Legal Defense & Education Fund, 
Inc. 38 All of the plaintiffs in Cornelius were organizations that 
attempted to influence public policy through one or more of the 
following activities: political activity, advocacy, lobbying, and liti-
gation on behalf of others.39 At issue was an Executive Order that 
excluded "[a]gencies that seek to influence the outcomes of elections 
or the determination of public policy through political activity or 
advocacy, lobbying, or litigation on behalf of parties other than 
themselves" from participating in the Combined Federal Campaign, 
a charity appeal directed at federal employees.40 Justice O'Connor 
found that the Combined Federal Campaign was a non-public forum 
and that the restriction did not violate the First Amendment because 
. it was viewpoint-neutra1. 41 Although the Court upheld the restriction, 
the cause was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether 
the viewpoint-neutral restriction was in fact "a facade for viewpoint-
based discrimination.' '42 
Justice Blackmun, who was not persuaded by the government's 
contention that the restriction was viewpoint-neutral because it ap-
plied equally to all advocacy groups regardless of their political or 
philosophical predispositions,43 dissented in Cornelius on the grounds 
that the restriction, on its face, discriminated on the basis of view-
point. 44 Justice Blackmun viewed the relevant comparison not as 
between the individual organizations that composed the excluded 
group, but rather between the organizations allowed access to the 
campaign and those denied access.4S The fact that government em-
37. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 66 (1983) 
(Brennan, J.,_ dissenting) (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servo 
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980». 
38. 473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
39. [d. at 793. The plaintiffs in Cornelius were: the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, the Puerto Rican Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, the Federally Employed Women Legal Defense 
and Education Fund, the Indian Law Resource Center, the Lawyer's Committee 
for Civil Rights Under Law, and the Natural Resources Defense Council. [d. 
40. [d. at 790, 795. 
41. [d. at 810-11. 
42. [d. at 811-13. 
43. [d. at 832 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
44. [d. at 814. Justice Blackmun emphasized that even in a non-public forum 
government- cannot discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint. [d. 
at 819. Justice Stevens, in his Cornelius dissent, stated that he did not consider 
the precise characterization of the forum to be helpful in arriving at a result. 
[d. at 833 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
45. [d. at 832 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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ployees could hear from only those charities of the opinion that 
charitable goals can best be achieved within the framework of existing 
social policy and the status quo was viewed as "blatantly" viewpoint 
based.46 
On two recent occasions, the Court has addressed the constitu-
tionality of flag desecration laws. In Texas v. Johnson,47 Johnson 
was convicted of desecrating an American flag in violation of Texas 
law.48 During the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, 
Johnson participated in a political demonstration protesting Reagan 
administration policies.49 The demonstration concluded with Johnson 
setting fire to an American flag. so 
The Supreme Court held that the statute violated the First 
Amendment because a bedrock principle underlying the First Amend-
ment is that government cannot prohibit the expression of ideas 
merely because society may find them offensive or disagreeableY 
Likewise, government cannot prohibit expression because it disagrees 
with the message intended to be conveyedY The statute conflicted 
with the notion that the best test of the truth is the ability of the 
thought to be accepted in the marketplace of ideas. s3 
46. Id. at 833. 
47. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
48. Id. at 399. 
49.Id. 
50.Id. 
51. Id. at 414; see also Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 
2395, 2404 (1992) (holding that speech cannot be financially burdened any 
more than it can be punished or banned simply because it may offend a hostile 
mob); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (finding the fact that society 
may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason to suppress, but rather 
reason to afford it constitutional protection), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978); 
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965) (stating that the function of 
free speech is to invite dispute and it may best serve its high purpose when it 
induces unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or stirs 
people to anger). 
52. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 416; see also Forsyth County, 112 S. Ct. at 2403 (absence 
of standards for assessing permit fees allowed administrator to encourage some 
views and discourage others through arbitrary application of fees). 
53. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 418. In the context of discussing the search for the 
truth value, the Court commented that the First Amendment does not guarantee 
other concepts regarded as virtually sacred, such as the principle that race 
discrimination is odious and destructive, from being subjected to the test of 
the marketplace of ideas. [d. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969». Accord R.A.V. v. City of S1. Paul, 112 S. C1. 2538, 2547-48 (1992) 
(prosecution for burning cross on African-American family's yard under Bias-
Motivated Crime Ordinance was viewpoint based) (see infra notes 62-65 and 
accompanying text for further discussion); Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85, 
87-90 (2d Cir. 1992) (creation of alternative class sections and threat of future 
discipline in response to professor's writings containing denigrating comments 
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One of the interests asserted by the State of Texas in defending 
Johnson's conviction was the preservation of the flag as a symbol 
of national unity. 54 The Court rejected the preservation argument, 
noting that Johnson was prosecuted for expressing dissatisfaction 
with his country's policies - expression situated at the core of First 
Amendment values. 55 The Court went on to add: "To conclude that 
the Government may permit designated symbols to be used to com-
municate only a limited set of messages would be to enter territory 
having no discernible or defensible boundaries. "56 The Court indi-
cated that the way to preserve the flag's special significance is not 
to punish those who feel differently, but rather to persuade them 
that they are wrong.57 While advocating persuasion, the Court quoted 
from Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v. California: "If 
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, 
to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be 
applied is more speech, not enforced silence. "58 
In response to the Court's decision in Johnson, Congress passed 
the Flag Protection Act of 1989, which became the subject of the 
Court's opinion in United States v. Eichman. 59 As in Johnson, the 
regarding the intelligence and social characteristics of African-Americans vio-
lated the First Amendment); Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George 
Mason Univ., 773 F. Supp. 792, 793, 795 (E.D. Va. 1991) (discipline imposed 
on fraternity for skit containing offensive racial and sexual stereotypes violated 
First Amendment because the First Amendment does not recognize exceptions 
for bigotry, racism, religious intolerance, or matters some view as trivial, 
vulgar, or profane); UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of 
Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1168-81 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (University's rule 
authorizing discipline for comments, epithets, or other expressive behavior or 
physical conduct that intentionally demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, 
disability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry, or age violates the 
overbreadth doctrine). 
54. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 400. The other interest was the prevention of breaches 
of the peace. [d.; see infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text. 
55. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411. 
56. [d. at 417 (emphasis added). Professor Ely has written a definitive article on 
the First Amendment and flag desecration. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: 
A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment 
Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975). Statutes aimed at protecting the flag's 
symbolism and that prohibit acts such as flag burning discriminate on the basis 
of viewpoint because they "proscribe only ideologically charged acts, and 
beyond that, only acts charged with a particular set of ideological outlooks." 
[d. at 1502~03. 
57. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 419. 
58. [d. (quoting Whitney v. Cali/ornia, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring». 
59. 496 U.S. 310 (1990). The Flag Protection Act, in relevant part, provided: 
(a)(l) Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, 
maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the 
United States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not 
more than one year, or both. 
[d. at 314. 
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defendants in Eichman were prosecuted for setting American flags 
aJire.60 Relying extensively on its opinion in Johnson, the Court held 
that the Act, which it found to be insufficiently distinct from Texas' 
statute, violated the First Amendment. 61 
The Court's most recent pronouncement on viewpoint discrimi-
nation occurred in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.62 In that case, the 
defendant was charged under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime 
Ordinance, which prohibited placing on public or private property 
certain items likely to arouse anger, alarm, or resentment on the 
basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender. 63 It was alleged that 
the defendant had violated the Ordinance by burning a cross in the 
yard of an African-American family. 64 The Court held that the 
ordinance violated the First Amendment's prohibition against view-
point discrimination because it applied only to speech which aroused 
intense emotions based upon race, color, creed, religion, or gender. 65 
In light of the values underlying the First Amendment and the 
prohibition against viewpoint discrimination, the remaining question 
is whether prohibiting the solicitation of abortion violates the First 
Amendment. 
III. PROHIBITING THE SOLICITATION OF ABORTION 
A. Viewpoint Discrimination 
Prohibiting the solicitation of abortion is viewpoint based dis-
crimination that contravenes the purposes animating the First Amend-
60. [d. at 312. The defendants in Appeal No. 89-1433 set fire to several flags on 
the steps of the Capitol while protesting various aspects of the Government's 
domestic and foreign policy. [d. The defendants in Appeal No. 89-1434 set 
fire to a flag while protesting the passage of the Flag Protection Act. [d. 
61. [d. at 315-18. The Court declined to accept the Government's invitation to 
reconsider Johnson in light of what was contended to be Congress' recent 
recognition of a national consensus opposing flag burning. [d. at 318. 
62. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
63. [d. at 2541. The Ordinance provided as follows: 
[d. 
64. [d. 
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, 
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, 
a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable 
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the 
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly 
conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
65. [d. at 2547-49. The Justices who concurred in the Court's unanimous decision 
opined that the ordinance was unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds. [d. at 
2550, 2558-61 (opinions of White, Blackmun, and Stevens, 11., concurring). 
1991] Solicitation of Abortion 119 
ment. Prior to enactment, the Guam statute's sponsor advocated 
passage on the grounds that Guam is a Christian community. 66 After 
the law was proposed, an "overwhelming majority" of those who 
testified at a hearing on the law supported it on the grounds of 
"religious belief or orientation. "67 The district court in Guam Society 
oj Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada recognized the solicitation 
provision discriminated on the basis of viewpoint when, without 
elaboration, it relied on Texas v. Johnson to conclude that the 
provision violated the First Amendment. 68 
The crime of "criminal solicitation" encompasses requests and 
encouragements to commit crimes.69 The complaint filed against Ms. 
Benshoof by the Attorney General of Guam alleged that: 
On or about the 20th day of March, 1990, in the Territory 
of Guam, Janet Benshoof did knowingly solicit a person or 
persons to submit to an abortion in violation of 9 Guam 
Code Annotated section 31.23, as amended.70 
The Affidavit of Probable Cause, which alleged that on March 20, 
1990, Ms. Benshoof had addressed a gathering assembled at The 
Press Club of Guam to discuss the signing of the law, asserted: 
That during her presentation Ms. Benshoof indicated that 
she was aware that Guam's Anti-Abortion law prohibited 
the solicitation of pregnant women interested in getting 
abortions by advising them where they could obtain abor-
tions. 
That in the presence of members of the Guam Press Club 
and others attending this meeting, Ms. Benshoof publicly 
encouraged women seeking abortions on Guam to have the 
abortion and travel to Honolulu, Hawaii. She mentioned 
66. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp. 1422, 1425 
(D. Guam 1990) (Guam I). 
67. Id. (quoting Committee Report on Bill No. 848). A chart, appended to the 
Respondents' Ninth Circuit Brief in Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecol-
ogists v. Ada, summarized the oral legislative testimony on the law. The chart 
identified the names 'of those people who testified and whether they favored 
Bill 848, believed life begins at conception, and included religious references 
in their testimonies. A second chart summarizing the written legislative testi-
mony, also appended to the Respondents' Ninth Circuit Brief, was structured 
in the same fashion as the chart summarizing oral testimony. The two charts 
reflect the Committee Report finding. 
68. Guam I, 776 F. Supp. at 1428, 1429 n.9 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 414 (1989». . 
69. KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 110 (1989). 
70. See Court File Criminal Case No. CM 0160-90 commenced in The Superior 
Court of Guam. 
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that there were places in Honolulu where women could 
obtain low cost abortions. Benshoof then gave a telephone 
number which women traveling to Honolulu to have abor-
tions should call. 71 
A March 21, 1990, memorandum by the Attorney General of 
Guam stated that the solicitation provision prohibited "a medical 
professional or any other person from recommending to a woman 
that she seek an abortion in a location other than Guam by making 
such recommendations a crime.' '72 Before turning to the constitutional 
problems posed by the solicitation provision, it should be noted that, 
in any case, prosecuting Ms. Benshoof was improper because her 
actions did not constitute "criminal solicitation." Ms. Benshoof did 
not engage in criminal solicitation because she did not request or 
encourage anyone to obtain an elective abortion in Guam, but rather 
advised women of where they could still go to obtain a legal elective 
abortion. 73 
The charge against Ms. Benshoof was unwarranted not only 
because her actions did not constitute criminal solicitation, but also 
because she could not have been convicted since the Guam law 
violated the First Amendment. The solicitation provision was view-
point based because it sought to regulate speech favorable to the 
alternative of abortion. Speech dealing with abortion is of high value 
because it is an essential part of the exposition of ideas with sub-
stantial social value as a step towards realizing the truth about a 
highly controversial issue.74 Particularly significant is the fact that by 
71. Id. 
72. Plaintiffs' Brief at 79 (quoting Attorney General's Memorandum), Guam Soc'y 
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp. 1422 (D. Guam 1990). 
73. It should be noted that if a particular behavior is constitutionally protected 
then encouragement of that behavior would always or nearly always be pro-
tected as well. See GREENAWALT, supra note 69, at 280 n.34; see also Valley 
Family Planning v. North Dakota, 489 F. Supp. 238, 242 (D.N.D. 1980) (if 
government cannot interfere with or prohibit an activity, then it also cannot 
regulate discussion relating to that activity), aff'd, 661 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1981). 
From the noted principle, it necessarily follows that as long as Roe remains 
the law a jurisdiction cannot prohibit the solicitation of abortion within that 
jurisdiction even if that jurisdiction has declared abortion to be illegal. Even 
if the Court abandons Roe, however, speech such as that of Ms. Benshoof is 
protected both because of the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination and 
other First Amendment doctrines. 
74. The protection afforded particular speech by the First Amendment is contingent 
upon whether that speech is of low or high First Amendment value. See Stone, 
supra note 21, at 194-96. Low value speech is entitled to only limited consti-
tutional protection. Id. at 194. Limitations on high value speech, which are 
evaluated according to a more speech-protective analysis than restrictions on 
low value speech, approach absolute protection. Id. at 196. 
The distinction between low and high value speech was first recognized in 
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discriminating on the basis of viewpoint, the Guam statute substan-
tially impaired the communication of information relating to the 
option of abortion.7s 
The law discriminated on the basis of viewpoint because it sought 
to remove from public debate only the message that abortion is an 
alternative to childbirth. The Supreme Court has stated that "debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .... "76 
The solicitation provision precluded such debate on the alternative 
of abortion, mutilated "the thinking process of the community," 
and conflicted with the values sought to be advanced by the First 
Amendment. 77 There was no "equality of status in the field of ideas" 
because the only message that could be presented was that childbirth 
was preferable to abortion. 78 
The law's restriction on speech was contrary to the three purposes 
commonly associated with First Amendment jurisprudence.79 First, 
the dicta of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), where the 
Court noted: "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech ... 
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." [d. at 194 
(citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72). Professor Stone has noted that the 
precise factors that cause .particular classes of speech to fall within the realm 
of low value speech is somewhat obscure. See Stone, supra note 21, at 194. 
Certain categories of speech, however, are of low value because they are viewed 
as not furthering the underlying purposes of the First Amendment. /d. Classes 
of speech receiving only low value protection are words of incitement, false 
statements, obscenity, commercial speech, fighting words, and child pornog-
raphy. [d. at 194-95. 
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in R.A. V. v. City oj St. Paul indicated 
that "a limited categorical approach has remained an important part of our 
First Amendment jurisprudence." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 
2543 (1992). Despite that observation, Justice White, in his concurring opinion, 
argued that the majority had "cast£) aside" any notion of a categorical 
approach to analyzing free speech questions. [d. at 2551-54 (White, J., con-
curring). The majority opinion also caused Justice Blackmun to conclude that 
if categorization is now forbidden, then protection of speech interests will be 
reduced "across the board." [d. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring). For 
Justice Stevens, the majority had "revise[d)" a categorical approach which he 
regarded as "unsound." [d. at 2562, 2566 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice 
Stevens' primary criticism was that the categorical approach failed to seriously 
account for the importance that context plays in evaluating free speech issues. 
[d. at 2566. Additionally, Justice Stevens opined that categorization seeks to 
superimpose straight and unwavering dividing lines when free speech matters 
do not lend themselves to such treatment. [d. 
75. See supra notes 35-65 and accompanying text. 
76. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (holding that actual 
malice must be shown before damages can be awarded in a libel action brought 
by a public official). 
77. See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text. 
78. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text. 
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the citizenry could not make informed choices when it was precluded 
from hearing speech offering abortion as an alternative to childbirth, 
thus stifling the self-governing purpose.80 Second, the "search for 
the truth" about the option of abortion versus childbirth was un-
dermined since there was an inhibited marketplace of ideas devoid 
of the competition envisioned by Justice Holmes.8' Third, the restric-
tion deprived individuals of the opportunity to promote their sense 
of self-worth by removing the abortion alternative from public dis-
course, thereby restraining people from exercising their rational ca-
pacities. 82 
Especially significant is the fact that the Court has stated that 
within the uninhibited marketplace of 'ideas secured by the First 
Amendment, the public is entitled "to receive suitable access to 
social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experi-
ences .... ' '83 The subject of abortion is one of the most widely 
debated social and moral issues today, evoking strong sentiments 
from those on both sides of the issue.84 Guam's law, as evidenced 
by the grounds for bringing the charges against Ms. Benshoof and 
by the Attorney General's memorandum, sought to advance the 
viewpoint that abortion is a social and moral evil, while prohibiting 
discussion of the opposing view.8s The law was motivated by the fact 
that Guam is a Christian community, and the law's pronouncements 
were regarded as consistent with the "religious belief or orientation" 
of its population. 86 This justification is not the sort of compelling 
80, See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. 
81. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
82. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
83. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969) (emphasis added) 
(addressing constitutionality of the FCC fairness doctrine); see also Vincent 
Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 449, 460 (1985) (noting that the communication of a fact or value 
judgment relating to a matter of public concern cannot be prohibited solely 
on the grounds that it erodes moral standards). 
84. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 571 & n.16 
(1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the intensely divisive character of 
much of the national debate on abortion reflects deeply held religious convic-
tions yet religious organizations submitted amicus briefs on both sides of the 
abortion issue). 
85. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
86. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. The predominant religious affil-
iation in Guam is Catholic. Lewin, supra note 4. When the law was being 
debated, the Archbishop threatened to excommunicate any Catholic legislator 
who voted against it. Id. This sort of action by Catholic authorities is of 
particular significance when viewed in light of that portion of Justice Stevens' 
dissent in Webster which addressed Missouri's declaration that the life of all 
human beings commences at conception. Although other members of the Court 
who voted to uphold the Missouri law declined to reach the validity of that 
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governmental interest that should serve as the basis for viewpoint 
discrimination. Such discrimination should fall when subjected to 
strict scrutiny because the public is entitled to access to discourse 
concerning social and moral ideas and experiences. 87 
For example, despite the fact that racial discrimination is viewed 
as offensive by the vast majority of people, the Court has not sought 
to insulate that view from being tested in the marketplace of ideas. 88 
The Court has gone so far as to find in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul 
that although society has a compelling interest in eradicating forms 
of discrimination with a long history, including racial discrimination, 
declaration, see Webster, 492 U.S. at 507, 523, 532, Justice Stevens argued 
that such a pronouncement violated the Establishment Clause because there 
was no secular purpose and was an unequivocal endorsement of a religious 
tenet of some, but not all Christian faiths. [d. at 566 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. 
Ct. 2791, 2839 (1992) (stating that for a state's interest in potential human life 
to be legitimate it must be secular and consistent with the First Amendment 
in not promoting a theological or sectarian interest) (Stevens, J., concurring 
and dissenting); id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (the 
Establishment Clause precludes a state's interest in potential life from being 
theological or sectarian). But cj. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318-20 (1980) 
(the fact that the Hyde Amendment's· abortion funding restrictions coincide 
with Roman Catholic Church's religious tenets, without more, does not con-
travene the Establishment Clause). 
Guam's solicitation provision ran afoul of not only the Free Speech Clause, 
but also the Establishment Clause because it lacked a secular purpose and 
endorsed Catholic religious tenets. This is true, despite the Court's recent 
emphasis upon evaluating Establishment Clause claims according to a coercion 
test. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992). Justices Blackmun, 
Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter adhere to the view that proof of government 
coercion is not a necessary prerequisite for demonstrating an Establishment 
Clause violation and endorsement is an appropriate criterion for assessing 
claims advanced under that clause. [d. at 2664, 2671-72, 2676-77 (opinions of 
Blackmun and Souter, JJ.). Although Justice Kennedy has emphasized the role 
of coercion, see id. at 2655, and has disapproved of employing endorsement 
as a barometer for evaluating Establishment Clause challenges, see County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668-74 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring and 
dissenting), he has also indicated his belief that government cannot engage in 
efforts to proselytize on behalf of religion, see id. at 664. The effort to prohibit 
speech that conflicts with Catholic tenets, in order to advance those tenets, 
should be viewed as a form of proselytization. 
87. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
88. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,418 (1989) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444 (1969»; see also supra note 53 and cases cited therein; cj. Federal 
Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256-
65 (1986) (rejecting the notion that the Federal Election Commission had a 
compelling interest to force compliance with federal statute prohibiting use of 
corporate funds in connection with federal elections by Massachusetts Citizens 
for Life when the speech that opposed abortion was core political speech). 
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that such an interest must be achieved through means other than 
laws that discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. 89 
Simply because abortion is morally offensive to certain segments 
of the population does not constitute a compelling interest so as to 
exempt its discussion from the scrutiny of the marketplace of ideas. 90 
Even if, sometime in the future, preventing abortions is found to be 
a compelling interest, adequate alternatives to viewpoint discrimina-
tory laws such as education could further such an interesUI Guam's 
89. 112 S. Ct. at 2549-50. The St. Paul Ordinance was not reasonably necessary 
to accomplish the asserted compelling interests because the only interest served 
by the viewpoint restriction was to display the city council's special hostility 
towards certain forms of biases. [d. 
90. Although the Guam law did not employ the phraseology "compelling interest" 
in its Legislative Findings, see supra note 2, recent efforts aimed at restricting 
abortion in other states have included use of such language as a portion of 
their findings or purpose. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West Supp. 
1992) (declared unconstitutional in Sojourner T. v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp. 930 
(E.D. La. 1991), a/I'd sub nom. Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th 
Cir. 1992»; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301.1 (Supp. 1992). Guam argued before 
the Ninth Circuit that its law sought to advance a "compelling interest." Guam 
Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1372-74 (9th 
Cir.) (Guam II), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992). In rejecting Guam's 
assertion, the Ninth Circuit, in part, commented that "a view of the state's 
interest in potential life as 'compelling' throughout pregnancy does not nec-
essarily mean that it sweeps all other interests out of the way. There is a 
countervailing right in issue here, although we find little reflection of it in 
Guam's briefs." [d. at 1373 (footnote omitted). 
In the Guam case, the Ninth Circuit also observed that there must be 
limits to the ability of a state's interest in potential life, whether or not that 
interest is compelling, to override all conflicting interests. [d. at 1373 n.9. That 
observation is particularly appropriate in the context of prohibiting the solici-
tation of abortion, as the public is entitled to reasonable access to social and 
moral ideas and experiences, therefore, any claim of a compelling interest 
should fail. Also, government has a compelling interest not to violate the 
Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Doe V. Small, 934 F.2d 743, 770 (7th Cir. 
1991) (citing Widmar V. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981) to support finding 
that display of sixteen pictures depicting Christ's life in city park violated 
Establishment Clause), rev'd, 964 F.2d 611, 621-22 (7th Cir. 1992) (en banc) 
(reversing granting of injunction on the grounds that it was overbroad in 
prohibiting display of pictures by any group) (Cudahy, J., concurring, relying 
on Widmar, while observing that compliance with the Establishment Clause is 
a compelling state interest, id. at 625); Kaplan V. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 
[024, 1030 (2d Cir.) (display of menorah in City Hall Park violated Establish-
ment Clause), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1989). As previously discussed, see 
supra note 86, prohibiting the solicitation of abortion also violates the Estab-
lishment Clause, and therefore, even a statement asserting that fetal protection 
is a compelling interest does not validate prohibiting the solicitation of abortion. 
91. Cf R.A.V. V. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549-50 (1992) (finding that 
there were sufficient means, other than an ordinance which discriminated on 
the basis of viewpoint, available to advance compelling interest of eradicating 
discrimination). 
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restriction on the discussion of the abortion option represented a 
clear case of censorship that jeopardized the vitality of free speech 
and that was "blatantly" viewpoint based.92 
Since the Guam solicitation prohibition was viewpoint based, 
the district court's reliance on Texas v. Johnson was well founded. 93 
The law conflicted with the First Amendment since the Guam legis-
lature attempted to silence speech favorable to the abortion option 
because it disagreed with those espousing that view.94 Just as those 
who would prohibit flag burning were urged to redirect their efforts 
to persuasion, so too should adherents of the view that abortion is 
morally wrong channel their energies towards persuasion, which at 
the same time respects the rights of others to disagree with their 
view.95 Such a view is in keeping with Justice Brandeis' admonition 
that what should be fostered is more speech and not enforced 
silence.96 
Efforts directed at prohibiting the solicitation of abortion are 
neither novel nor confined to the Territory of Guam. The State of 
Montana, for example, prohibits physicians, other persons, or facil-
ities from engaging in solicitation or other forms of communication 
the purpose of which is to invite, induce, or attract anyone to have 
an abortion. 97 Montana's Code declares that the proscribed conduct 
constitutes a misdemeanor. 98 
Similarly, the State of Vermont has criminalized the furnishing 
to the public, whether by print, writing, words or language, any 
information or advice meant to cause or to facilitate the procurement 
of an abortion. 99 The Vermont provision authorizes a maximum 
prison term of ten years, while mandating a sentence of not less 
92. ct. supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. 
93. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
94. Ct. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); supra note 51 and accompanying 
text. 
95. Ct. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); supra note 57 and accompanying 
text; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (citing Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) in holding that the role of the First Amendment 
is to assure the unfettered exchange of ideas for bringing about political and 
social change). 
96. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
97. The "[c]ontrol of [the] practice of abortion" is codified in MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 50-20-109 (1991). In particular, § 50-20-109(4) provides that: "No physician, 
facility, or other person or agency shall engage in solicitation, advertising, or 
other form of communication having the purpose of inviting, inducing, or 
attracting any person to come to such physician, facility, or other person or 
agency to have an abortion or to purchase abortifacients." 
98. [d. § 50-20-109(5). 
99. The "[a]dvertising or dealing in anything to cause miscarriage" is governed by 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 104 (Supp. 1991). 
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than three years. IOO Likewise, the State of Louisiana prohibits the 
placing or carrying of any advertisement relating to abortion services 
through the publication of the availability of those services. 101 The 
United States Virgin Islands forbids the creation of any public or 
private organization or society for the purpose of soliciting candidates 
for abortion. 102 
The Guam solicitation provision is not the first to be declared 
unconstitutional. In the 1980 case Leigh v. Olson,103 the United States 
District Court for the District of North Dakota considered a challenge 
to a North Dakota solicitation statute that prohibited physicians, 
hospitals, or any other person from advertising or participating in 
any form of communication whose purpose was to invite, induce, or 
attract a woman to obtain an abortion. I04 The plaintiffs in Olson 
were Dr. Richard Leigh, a gynecologist who performed abortions, 
100. The text of VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,§ 104 (Supp. 1991), in its entirety, provides 
that: 
A person who knowingly causes to be made public by print, writing, 
words or language that give any information where anything, or any 
advice or information, may be obtained for the purpose of causing 
or procuring the miscarriage of a pregnant woman, shall be imprisoned 
not more than ten years nor less than three years. A person who sells 
or gives away anything for the purpose of producing such miscarriage 
shall be imprisoned not more than three years nor less than one year 
and fined not more than $500.00 nor less than $200.00, or both. 
101. The Louisiana prohibition against "[a)bortion advertising," found in LA. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:87.4 (West 1986), provides that: 
Abortion advertising is the placing or carrying of any advertisement 
of abortion services by the publicizing of the availability of abortion 
services. 
Whoever commits the crime of abortion advertising shall be impris-
oned, with or without hard labor, for not more than one year or 
fined not more than five thousand dollars, or both. 
By proscribing the publicizing of the availability of abortion services through 
the placing of any advertisement, the Louisiana statute appears to preclude 
such actions as those of Ms. Benshoof in which she advised women of where 
abortion remained legal. 
102. The Virgin Islands statute, V.1. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 153 (Supp. 1992), is 
captioned "[s)oliciting abortion prohibited." That section provides that: "No 
public or private organization or society shall be created for the purpose of 
soliciting candidates for abortion; however, this provision shall in no way be 
construed to restrict the legitimate activities of the Family Planning Clinic 
conducted by the Department of Health." 
103. 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D.N.D. 1980). 
104. [d. at 1342-43, 1350. Under N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-06 (1991), "[s)oliciting 
abortions" was prohibited. That statute declared that: "No licensed physician 
or licensed hospital, or any person employed by the licensed physician or 
licensed hospital, nor any other person may advertise or participate in any 
form of communication having as its purpose the inviting, inducing, or attract-
ing of a pregnant woman to undergo an abortion." 
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and Jane Bovard, a counselor who desired to furnish advice regarding 
abortion to women in North Dakota. lOs 
Initially, the district court found Dr. Leigh's providing of abor-
tion services, his discussion about those services with patients, and 
Ms. Bovard's counseling services, to constitute behavior prohibited 
by the solicitation statute. 106 The court then indicated that the poten-
tial application of the statute was so broad that a person of ordinary 
intelligence might not be able to determine whether particular conduct 
or utterances were proscribed. I07 Because of these deficiencies, the 
district court concluded the statute was so vague that it violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.lOs Although;?the dis-
trict court stated that it was unnecessary to address whether the 
statute violated the First Amendment, it noted "that the threat of 
criminal sanctions for communications having as their purpose invit-
ing, inducing or attracting a pregnant woman to undergo an abortion 
would effectively deter the exercise of free speech." 109 
In 1991, the Utah Legislature enacted laws limiting a woman's 
right to obtain an abortion.110 These laws permitted abortion only 
when a woman's life was threatened, when she would sustain grave 
damage to her health, when the pregnancy was the result of rape or 
incest, or when the child would be born with grave birth defects.111 
Although the Utah laws did not contain a solicitation provision 
similar to that employed in the Guam law, the possibility of someone 
being charged in a situation similar to that of Ms. Benshoof has 
surfaced as an issue. News media reports have included accounts that 
the American Civil Liberties Union has expressed concerns that 
individuals could be charged with solicitation if the new laws were 
read in conjunction with Utah's general solicitation statute. ll2 Those 
105. Olson, 497 F. Supp. at 1343. While neither plaintiff had engaged in advertising, 
the district court noted if they had wished to have done so the State could not 
have precluded such activity. [d. at 1350 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 
809 (1975» (see infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Bigelow). 
106. Olson, 497 F. Supp. at 1350. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. 
109. [d. (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967». 
110. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-301.1(4) & 76-7-302 (Supp. 1992). 
111. [d. 
112. Legislature's Rush to Judgment Created Flawed Abortion Law, THE SALT LAKE 
TRmuNE, Mar. 26, 1991, at A12 (editorial) [hereinafter LEGISLATURE'S RUSH]; 
Legislature Keeps Utah Fighting in Unnecessary Abortion Battle, THE SALT 
LAKE TRmuNE, Apr. 21, 1991, at A16 (editorial). Criminal solicitation in Utah 
is governed by UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-203 to 76-4-204 (Supp. 1992). 
In a recent Utah case, which did not present the problem of someone who 
was charged with solicitation, the district court rejected a free speech challenge 
to Utah's abortion laws. The district court found that Utah's abortion laws 
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concerns included the possibility of prosecutions for discussing abor-
tion when the discussions focused on the possibility of accessing legal 
abortion services in neighboring states.1I3 
The fact that solicitation prohibitions and the controversy sur-
rounding them have not been unique to Guam suggests that not only 
Roe has been targeted by those who want government to reflect their 
morality on the subject of abortion, but the First Amendment as 
well, to the extent that it requires unfettered discussion on contro-
versial subjects. Because some elected officials have been willing to 
champion the view that their governments, as well as the entire 
United States, can and should endorse laws that treat the availability 
of abortion as a moral evil,1I4 the challenge to a woman's right to 
choice under Roe has been expanded to include a challenge to the 
First Amendment's free speech guarantees. 
The promulgation of the regulations at issue in Rust v. Sullivan 
is indicative of the generalized threat facing the free speech guarantees 
of the First Amendment as a result of the moral debate surrounding 
abortion. 1I5 In Rust, the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services promulgated regulations restricting the activities of 
Title X fund recipients as they related to the abortion alternative.1I6 
The regulations prohibited recipients from counseling or providing 
referrals for abortion as a method of family planning. ll7 Also, 
did not expose physicians, clergy, and counselors to accessorial liability for 
engaging in abortion counseling. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537, 
1547-48 (C.D. Utah 1992). In Bangerter, the court reasoned that under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (1990), accessorial liability was premised on aiding, 
encouraging, or soliciting someone who is engaged in conduct that constituted 
an offense, and physicians, clergy, and counselors were not engaged in conduct 
declared to be illegal. [d. 
113. Legislature's Rush, supra note 112, at A12. 
114. See, e.g., DeBenedictis, supra note 16, at 20-21 (discussing federal district 
courts' rulings on Guam and Pennsylvania abortion restrictions aimed at directly 
challenging Roe); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West 1986 & Cum. Supp. 
1992) (limiting permissibility of abortion to circumstances in which the woman's 
life or fetus is endangered and when pregnancy is product of rape or incest) 
(declared unconstitutional in Sojourner T. v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. 
La. 1991), a/I'd sub nom. Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 
1992»; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-301.1, 76-7-302 (Supp. 1992) (limiting avail-
ability of abortion to when the woman's life is threatened or when she will 
sustain grave damage to her health, or the pregnancy results from rape or 
incest, or a child would be born with grave birth defects). 
115. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
116. [d. at 1764-66. 
117. [d. at 1765. The issue of government prohibition of abortion counseling when 
its resources are in some manner connected to health care providers has been 
the subject of multiple journal articles. See Alexandra A.E. Shapiro, Note, 
Title X, the Abortion Debate, and the First Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 
1737, 1737 (1990) (Title X regulations impose an unconstitutional condition on 
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recipients were precluded from engaging in activities that encouraged, 
promoted, or advocated abortion as a form of family planning. liS 
The grantees in Rust challenged the regulations on the grounds 
that they discriminated on the basis of viewpoint by prohibiting 
discussion about abortion as a lawful option, while compelling the 
provision of information that encouraged continuing a pregnancy to 
term.1I9 The Court rejected the viewpoint discrimination challenge on 
the grounds that government may choose to fund an activity it 
believes to be in the public interest to the exclusion of other activities, 
and that it is not required to subsidize the exercise of a right. 120 In 
so holding, the Court noted that a basic difference exists between 
direct state interference with a protected activity and state encour-
agement of an alternative activity that is consistent with legislative 
policy. 121 
The Rust decision, however, does not constitute authority fa-
vorable to upholding solicitation provisions such as Guam's law. 
Prohibiting the solicitation of abortion is not linked in any manner 
to government funding. Conversely, Rust does provide support for 
the view that solicitation prohibitions violate the First Amendment, 
grantees' First Amendment rights to engage in political advocacy of abortion 
rights and to give medical advice about abortion); Carole I. Chervin, Note, 
The Title X Family Planning Gag Rule: Can the Government Buy Up Consti-
tutional Rights, 41 STAN. L. REV. 401, 410, 417 (1989) (Title X prohibition on 
abortion counseling is content-based and viewpoint discriminatory); C. Andrew 
McCarthy, Comment, The Prohibition on Abortion Counseling and Referral 
in Federally-Funded Family Planning Clinics, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1181, 1205-06 
(1989) (Title X prohibition on abortion counseling constitutes content restriction 
and viewpoint discrimination); Janet Benshoof, The Chastity Act: Government 
Manipulation of Abortion Information and the First Amendment, 101 HARV. 
L. REv. 1916, 1922, 1932 (1988) (prohibition on abortion counseling to grantees 
under Adolescent Family Life Act constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrim-
ination); Theodore C. Hirt, Why the Government is Not Required to Subsidize 
Abortion Counseling and Referral, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1895, 1900, 1909, 1914 
(1988) (government can choose childbirth as preferred social policy and is not 
required to subsidize abortion counseling under Adolescent Family Life Act); 
see also Reproductive Health Servo V. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1077 (8th Cir. 
1988) (addressing Missouri prohibition on use of public funds, public employees, 
and public facilities to encourage or counsel a woman to have an abortion), 
rev'd, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
118. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1765. 
119. Id. at 1771-72. 
120. Id. at 1772. 
121. Id. Justice Blackmun dissented in Rust and expressed his view that the regu-
lations discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. Id. at 1779-82 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). In Justice Blackmun's opinion, discrimination against a particular 
ideological viewpoint is a repugnant ground for denying the granting of funds. 
Id. at 1781-82. In Rust, Justice Blackmun found that the regulations were 
viewpoint based because the Government was seeking to deny funding to 
family-planning projects that advocated abortion, because they advocated abor-
tion. /d. at 1781. 
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for such prohibitions do constitute direct state interference with 
protected First Amendment speech dealing with abortion. Although 
the Rust decision is not authority that favors upholding solicitation 
prohibitions, it serves as evidence that free speech is at great risk in 
the moral debate surrounding abortion. The Rust regulations reflect 
certain elected officials' views that it is proper for government to 
impede the exercise of the abortion option, because segments of the 
population consider abortion morally reprehensible, even at the ex-
pense of the First Amendment. 122 Besides constituting unlawful view-
point discrimination, the Guam solicitation law, and other efforts 
like it, violate the First Amendment because they conflict with other 
recognized First Amendment doctrines. 
B. Other Free Speech Problems Besides Viewpoint Discrimination 
Beyond the viewpoint discrimination area, had Guam appealed 
the invalidation of the solicitation provision, and had the Supreme 
Court granted review and forsaken Roe, the solicitation provision 
should still have been found to violate the First Amendment because 
it conflicted with other well established First Amendment principles. 
In Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University 
of New York,123 the Court considered a New York motion picture 
licensing law that provided that a license shall be issued unless a 
movie was obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or was 
of such character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals 
or incite crime. The status of being immoral or of such character 
that exhibition would tend to corrupt morals was defined as films 
whose dominant purpose or effect was erotic or pornographic, which 
portrayed acts of sexual immorality, perversion, or lewdness, or 
122. Professor Blasi has authored a thesis that posits the existence of pathological 
periods for First Amendment core values. Blasi, supra note 83. The thesis 
proposes that at all times courts should "equip the first amendment to do 
maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox 
ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and most likely 
to stifle dissent systematically." [d. at 449-50. The feature which characterizes 
a period in time as being pathological is a shift in basic attitudes among certain 
influential individuals, if not the public at large, regarding the desirability of 
the central norms of the First Amendment. [d. at 467. The recent intolerance 
displayed towards flag burning and restrictions imposed on speech dealing with 
abortion suggest we are now in a pathological period. But see Mark V. Tushnet, 
Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 
27 WlJ!.. & MARY L. REv. 997, 1006-07 (1986) (criticizing the pathological 
period analysis because substantial costs are imposed on courts by demanding 
application of the restrictive doctrine when it is unnecessary and because it 
erroneously assumes that the courts are sufficiently insulated from political 
processes so as not to succumb to the accompanying political pressures). 
123. 360 U.S. 684, 685 (1959). 
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which expressly or impliedly presented such acts as desirable, ac-
ceptable or proper patterns of behavior .124 
Kingsley was denied a license to distribute Lady Chatterley's 
Lover because the theme of the picture was immoral, presenting 
adultery as a desirable, acceptable, and proper pattern of behavior .125 
The denial of the license was defended on the grounds that the 
picture attractively portrayed a relationship that was contrary to the 
moral standards, religious precepts, and legal code of New York's 
citizens.126 The Court found that the denial of the license struck at 
the heart of the First Amendment which is the freedom to advocate 
ideas. 127 The fact that the picture advocated conduct proscribed by 
law was not constitutional grounds for denying a license because 
advocacy of proscribed conduct is not "a justification for denying 
free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is 
nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted 
on. "128 The Court also noted that the deterrents employed to prevent 
crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not 
the abridgment of free speech. 129 
The distinction between advocacy and incitement likely to result 
in immediate lawless action was also the subject of the Court's 
decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio.130 There the defendant was con-
victed of violating the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute for his 
speech activities during a Ku Klux Klan rally. 131 The conviction was 
reversed because the Ohio law prohibited mere advocacy that was 
not also accompanied by incitement likely to culminate in imminent 
lawless action.132 
124. [d. at 685. 
125. [d. 
126. [d. at 688. 
127. [d. 
128. [d. at 689 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring»; see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969). 
129. Kingsley, 360 U.S. at 689 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 378 
(Brandeis, J., concurring». In Kingsley, the Court also drew from Thomas 
Jefferson noting that he wrote: "But we have nothing to fear from the 
demoralizing reasonings of some if others are left free to demonstrate their 
errors." Kingsley, 360 U.S. at 689 n.ll (quoting letter of Thomas Jefferson 
to Elijah Boardman (July 3, 1801), JEFFERSON PAPERS, Library of Congress, 
Vol. 115, folio 19761). 
130. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
131. [d. at 444-47. The conviction in Brandenburg was premised on the defendant 
"advocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, 
or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or 
political reform and for voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or 
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal 
syndicalism." [d. at 444-45 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13) (alter-
ations in original). 
132. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448-49. 
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In the situation involving Ms. Benshoof, in which there was 
nothing to suggest that the speech would have caused immediate 
lawlessness, Guam, like New York in Kingsley and Ohio in Bran-
denburg, certainly attempted to prohibit advocacy relating to pro-
scribed conduct that fell short of incitement. This is true because all 
that Ms. Benshoof did was to inform women that abortion remained 
legal in Hawaii, and to furnish a telephone number to be called 
regarding abortion services there. Additionally, it is arguable whether 
Ms. Benshoof's speech even constituted "advocacy" because she did 
not facilitate illegal abortions in Guam. 133 
The decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio is instructive also when 
considered in the context of Professor Kent Greenawalt's analytical 
approach to issues of criminal solicitation. Professor Greenawalt has 
urged that when crimes of criminal solicitation are at issue, the degree 
of protection afforded by the First Amendment should vary according 
to whether the solicitation is private or public, and whether the 
solicitation is ideological or nonideological. 134 Public and private 
speech are distinguished from one another by the fact that public 
speech involves the message being communicated in a manner in 
133. Professor Barnes has indicated that when an underlying activity is prohibited, 
government should be allowed to regulate speech likely to foster that unlawful 
activity. Richard L. Barnes, Regulations of Speech Intended to Affect Behavior, 
63 DENY. U. L. REv. 37, 39 (1985). Even if the Court were to adopt Professor 
Barnes' view of the First Amendment, while abandoning Roe, government 
should not be able to prohibit speech such as that of Ms. Benshoof, as she 
did not furnish women with information pertaining to how to obtain an 
abortion in Guam, but rather she merely informed them where they could go 
to obtain legal abortions. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. The 
Commonwealth of Virginia's regulation of "[e]ncouraging or promoting abor-
tion" appears to have been drafted in a manner consistent with Professor 
Barnes' views. That statute provides that: 
If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale 
or circulation of any publication, or through the use of a referral 
agency for profit, or in any other manner, encourage or promote the 
performing of an abortion or the inducing of a miscarriage in this 
Commonwealth which is prohibited under this article, he shall be 
guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76.1 (Michie 1988) (emphasis added). It should be noted 
that § 18.2-76.1 only bans the encouragement or promotion of an abortion in 
Virginia and only then when that abortion would violate other limitations 
imposed under Article 9, which governs abortion. Those other limitations 
include: 1) requiring second trimester abortions be performed in a licensed 
hospital; 2) requiring third trimester abortions be performed in a licensed 
hospital and only allowing abortions to preserve the life and health of women 
while also furnishing life support measures to be used if there is evidence of 
viability; and 3) requiring written consent before performing an abortion. VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-73, 18.2-74, 18.2-76 (Michie 1988). 
134. See GREENAWALT, supra note 69, at 260-72. 
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which its content can become known to a wide audience. 135 The 
feature that characterizes non ideological solicitation is telling someone 
that a particular act will benefit him or her .136 In contrast, ideological 
solicitation is identified with telling someone that something is "his 
duty or his right, or will be of broad benefit, or is warranted within 
some overall philosophical understanding of human life and social 
change."137 
The constitutional protection afforded the different types of 
solicitation lie along a continuum. At one end, where entitlement to 
the greatest protection is located; lies public ideological solicitation, 
and at the other end, where the least protection is afforded, is found 
private nonideological solicitation. 138 Somewhere along the continuum 
are private ideological solicitation and public nonideological solici-
tation.139 
Public ideological solicitation has substantial expressive value, 
demanding stringent requirements akin to those in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio be satisfied before speech can be limited. l40 Punishment for 
public ideological speech should only be allowed if it seriously 
threatens the public interest. 141 The public interest is only seriously 
threatened if a speaker steadfastly encourages the commission of a 
specific crime, it is reasonably likely that the speech will contribute 
to the commission of the crime, and that the crime will occur within 
the very near future. 142 Occurrence of the crime within the very near 
future is a requirement for punishing public ideological solicitation 
because the opportunity exists for countervailing speech and for the 
authorities to intercede to prevent the crime. 143 
Less protection is afforded private ideological solicitation because 
of the possibilities of overbearing influence and manipulation, the 
small audience, and the unavailability of countervailing perspec-
tives,144 Private ideological solicitation should not be punishable, 
however, unless it presents a significant danger to persons or prop-
erty.145 Public nonideological solicitation is also entitled to less pro-
tection because it is customarily associated with commercial speech.l46 
Unlike public ideological solicitation, private nonideological solici-
135. [d. at 271. 
136. [d. 
137. [d. at 271-72. 
138. [d. at 269. 
139. [d. at 269-71. 
140. [d. at 266, 268. 
141. [d. at 268. 
142. [d. at 266. 
143. [d. at 268. 
144. [d. at 269. 
145. [d. at 270. 
146. [d. at 270-71. 
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tation has slight expressive value when compared to its potential 
dangers and therefore punishing such speech does not impinge upon 
free speech Iiberties. 147 
Although Ms. Benshoof's speech did not constitute criminal 
solicitation because she did not urge women to obtain abortions in 
Guam,l48 even if her speech were scrutinized employing Professor 
Greenawalt's descriptive categories, it would be considered to con-
stitute protected public ideological solicitation. Clearly, her comments 
constituted public speech because they were presented to a gathering 
of the Guam Press Club and therefore were intended to be made 
known to a substantial audience. Her comments were ideological 
because they were designed to inform residents of Guam that although 
Guam had limited the right to an abortion, another state, Hawaii, 
still afforded women the right to choose to have an abortion. Also, 
those comments were consistent with a philosophical perspective that 
is integrated with the social ideology that women are entitled to 
control their reproductive capacities. 
The public interest was not seriously threatened but rather was 
advanced because the public had a right to receive information 
pertaining to social and moral issues. 149 Since no crime was encour-
aged, Ms. Benshoof's speech could not have reasonably contributed 
to the commission of a specific crime, which would occur in the very 
near future, through serious encouragement. Moreover, those who 
disagree with Ms. Benshoof undoubtedly had the opportunity to 
present their countervailing views. Even if Ms. Benshoof's comments 
had been made in private, to one person, so as to constitute private 
ideological solicitation, they would not have been punishable as there 
would have been no danger, significant or otherwise, to persons or 
property. 150 
This situation can be analogized to the events in Texas v. 
Johnson.151 Prior to the flag burning that occurred in Johnson, 
demonstration participants marched through Dallas streets chanting 
political slogans, stopped at corporations to stage "die-ins" to dram-
147. Id. at 264. 
148. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
149. See supra notes 83 & 87 and accompanying text. 
150. Danger to persons is, and should be, limited to persons who already have been 
born. This Article will not venture into the moral debate, which fuels the 
abortion controversy, whether a fetus is a person because it is irrelevant to the 
First Amendment issues presented by prohibiting the solicitation of abortion. 
Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 
2791, 2806 (1992) (although some members of the Court find abortion morally 
offensive, that sentiment cannot control the Court's decision because its obli-
gation is to define the liberty of all and not to mandate a particular moral 
code) Uoint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). 
151. 491 U.S. 397 (1989); see supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text. 
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atize the consequences of nuclear war, defaced the walls of buildings, 
and overturned potted plants. IS2 At the conclusion of those activities, 
Johnson ignited a flag that had been stolen from a flagpole outside 
one of the targeted buildings. lS3 Although no one was physically 
injured or threatened with injury, several witnesses testified that they 
had been seriously offended by the flag burning. ls4 
The State of Texas not only defended the statute on the grounds 
that it sought to preserve the flag as a symbol of national unity, it 
also asserted ari interest in preventing breaches of the peace. ISS The 
Court found that prevention of breaches of the peace was not 
implicated by the facts in Johnson.ls6 Also, the Court rejected the 
State's invitation to assume that every expression of a provocative 
idea will incite a riot, and concluded that the events surrounding the 
flag burning did not constitute incitement likely to produce imminent 
lawless action.1S7 Certainly, if the actions of Johnson and the other 
demonstrators were not likely to result in a riot, and thereby did not 
constitute incitement likely to result in imminent lawlessness, then 
Ms. Benshoof's speech, wherein she merely apprised women of where 
elective abortions remained legal, cannot be prohibited. 
Although government can prohibit certain conduct, it cannot 
punish speech dealing with that conduct. For example, in Bowers v. 
Hardwickls8 the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's sodomy statute, 
concluding that there was no fundamental liberty interest to engage 
in consensual homosexual activity. The decision in Bowers should be 
contrasted with the decision of the Tenth Circuit in National Gay 
Task Force v. Board oj Education oj Oklahoma City,1S9 which held 
that public school teachers cannot be terminated for advocating repeal 
of the State's sodomy law. l60 The Eighth Circuit's decision in Gay 
& Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohnl61 reflects a similar commitment 
by holding that the Gay and Lesbian Students Association at the 
University of Arkansas at Fayetteville could not be refused funding 
152. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399. The defendant, Johnson, however, did not participate 
in the noted activities. [d. 
153. [d. 
154. [d. 
155. [d. at 400. 
156. [d. at 407-09. 
157. [d. at 409 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969». 
158. 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986). 
159. 729 F.2d 1270; 1274-75 (10th Cir. 1984), a/I'd per curiam, 470 U.S. 903 (1985). 
While finding the proscription against advocating, encouraging, or promoting 
homosexual activity was overbroad, the court noted that statements "which 
are aimed at legal and social change, are at the core of First Amendment 
protections." [d. at 1274. 
160. [d. at 1274-75. 
161. 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988). 
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by the Student Senate because of views it espoused regarding ho-
mosexuality.162 By applying the reasoning that government can pro-
scribe particular conduct, but not speech involving that conduct, it 
follows that the charges brought against Ms. Benshoof violated the 
First Amendment. 163 
No matter the fate of Roe, speech such as that engaged in by 
Ms. Benshoof cannot be prohibited under Bigelow v. Virginia. l64 
Bigelow was a director and editor of a weekly Virginia newspaper 
that published an advertisement from a New York organization that 
informed readers that abortion remained legal in New York.165 Crim-
inal charges were brought against Bigelow for violating a Virginia 
statute that prohibited encouraging or promoting the procurement of 
an abortion through publication, lecture, advertisement or by the 
sale or circulation of any publication. l66 The Court concluded that 
the statute violated the First Amendment, holding that a state cannot 
prohibit an individual from disseminating information about an 
activity declared as illegal there, but which is legal in another state. 167 
Like Bigelow, Ms. Benshoof merely informed others about where 
elective abortions continued to be ·legal. Such speech is therefore 
protected by the First Amendment. l68 In addition, speech such as 
162. [d. at 367-68. In granting the Gay and Lesbian Students Association relief 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Judge Arnold noted that: 
[S]odomy is illegal in Arkansas. However, the GLSA does not advocate 
sodomy, and even if it did, its speech about an illegal activity would 
still be protected by the First Amendmen~. People may extol the 
virtues of arson or even cannibalism. They simply may not commit 
the acts. Thus, we reverse the District Court on the First Amendment 
issue. Conduct may be prohibited or regulated, within broad limits. 
But government may not discriminate against people because it dislikes 
their ideas, not even when the ideas include advocating that certain 
conduct now criminal be legalized. 
[d. at 368. 
163. Additional support for the position discussed can be found in Musser v. Utah, 
333 U.S. 95 (1948). There, the defendants were convicted of conspiring to 
commit acts injurious to public morals through their counseling or advising on 
polygamy. [d. at 96 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 103-11-1 (1943». The Court 
did not address the constitutionality of the statute, but vacated the judgment 
and remanded the case to the state court to interpret the statute that gave rise 
to the prosecutions. [d. at 95-98. Justice Rutledge, in dissent, would have 
reversed the convictions and observed that the "extreme position, that the state 
may prevent any conduct which induces people to violate the law, or any 
advocacy of unlawful activity, cannot be squared with the First Amendment." 
[d. at 102. 
164. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
165. [d. at 811-12. 
166. [d. at 812-13 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960». 
167. [d. at 824-25. 
168. Cj. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-08, 529 n.3 (1965) (While the 
1991] Solicitation of Abortion 137 
that of Ms. Benshoof is entitled to even greater protection than that 
in Bigelow because her speech was not commercial in nature. 169 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Guam solicitation provISIon discriminated on the basis of 
viewpoint because speech that favored the exercise of the option of 
abortion was prohibited while speech opposing that alternative was 
not barred. Such discrimination manifested itself in the charges 
brought against Ms. Benshoof. Besides the fatal viewpoint discrimi-
nation, the prosecution of Ms. Benshoof violated the First Amend-
ment, no matter the fate of Roe, because: (1) her speech did not 
constitute incitement likely to result in immediate lawlessness, (2) 
government cannot punish speech dealing with prohibited conduct, 
and (3) the First Amendment precludes a jurisdiction from prohibiting 
the furnishing of information regarding an activity declared as illegal 
there, but which is legal in another jurisdiction. 
Any assertion that the government has a compelling interest in 
perpetuating the view that abortion is morally wrong should be 
rejected because the values underlying the First Amendment mandate 
that the public have suitable access to all information relating to 
social and moral questions. Because efforts to limit the solicitation 
of abortion have not been confined to Guam, it is evident that the 
free speech guarantees of the First Amendment are at substantial 
risk. To the extent that governments and their leaders may be willing 
to champion the prohibition of the solicitation of abortion, the First 
Amendment is in jeopardy of becoming a casualty of the moral 
debate surrounding abortion. Courts should remain mindful of Justice 
Kennedy's observation in Lee v. Weisman that "[t]o endure the 
speech of false ideas or offensive content and then to counter it is 
part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society, a society which 
insists upon open discourse towards the end of a tolerant citizenry." 170 
Hopefully, the values animating the First Amendment will prevail in 
any future controversies that may arise involving abortion solicitation 
prohibitions. 
statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptives and the aiding of their use should 
have been held constitutional, speech or advocacy dealing with contraception, 
without affirmative conduct directed at violating the statutes, were protected 
by the First Amendment.) (Black and Stewart, 11., dissenting). 
169. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983) 
(holding that the Constitution accords less protection to commercial speech 
than other constitutionally safeguarded forms of expression). 
170. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2657 (1992). 
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